B. L. Saxena, Identification of Handwriting, Disputed Documents and Detection of Forgeries, p. 91 (Allahabad 1962). Similarly, another treatise states that the "most common error of the unqualified examiner is to describe an unusual characteristic as being individual when in fact it merely belongs to a writing system outside the sphere of his experience." O. Hilton, Scientific Examination of Questioned Documents, p. 160 (New York 1982).

I am unaware of any "forensic scientists" who are fluent in the handwriting system of Tibetan cursive and strongly doubt that any such scientist exists in the world, particularly since the Chinese government hardly recognizes the language. Moreover, any such "forensic scientist" who could analyze Tibetan would hardly be reliable since there would be no community of Tibetan handwriting examiners to judge his ability and credentials. This peer review is essential to reliable science. Lack of familiarity with the Tibetan cursive writing system would be a heavy handicap rendering any expert opinion unreliable.

It is a commonplace in handwriting analysis that no "two samples of writing prepared by anyone are identical in every detail, since variation is an integral part of writing." Hilton, at 159. This natural variation is increased by certain factors:

Writing variation is also influenced by physical and mental conditions, such as fatigue [and] illness. . . . . These several factors produce a varying degree of deterioration in the quality of writing, commensurable in its degree with the intensity of the cause. The advanced age of the writer and the quality of writing he prepares in the course of time may introduce greater variation between specimens written at widely separated dates. Id.

To make reliable comparisons, a handwriting expert must compare the disputed document to a sample written under similar conditions. The sample must be similar to the disputed document in the time at which it was written, the conditions under which the writings were performed, and the general purpose for which the writings were created. The writings must also have been created when the writer was in the same state of physical health. When it is not possible to find exemplars of handwriting prepared under similar conditions, inaccuracies result. The lack of appropriate samples results in unreliable analysis.

 [R]estricting conditions that may prevent a document examiner from reaching a positive conclusion or may permit him to arrive at only a qualified opinion: Lack of a sufficient amount of known writing is the most common deficiency, but standards written under very different circumstances from the questioned material also limit the findings. . . . A definite yes or no answer may also be precluded by wide differences between the dates of standard and disputed material, by an extremely hasty or careless bit of writing, or because a piece of writing was prepared during severe illness or under other adverse writing conditions. This is particularly true if no standards written under comparable conditions are available.

Id. at 168. The Prediction Letter is subject to all these problems. We know that His Holiness gave H.E. Situ Rinpoche the Prediction Letter in January of 1981, a few months prior to his death in the Fall of that year. It is unclear that His Holiness wrote the Prediction Letter at that time rather than many months or years earlier. This is a basic uncertainty. We also do not know under what conditions he wrote the letter, whether hurriedly on his knee or at his leisure on a desk, or elsewise. From the point of view of content and purpose of the document, we have no similar document to compare to the Prediction Letter since the Prediction Letter is part of a religious practice unique not only outside Tibet, but in Tibet as well. Additionally, His Holiness was increasingly ill in the last few years of his life. We have little way of determining how His Holiness' physical illness affected his handwriting as of the date of the Prediction Letter.

Courts in similar circumstances may find nonexpert opinions more believable than that of forensic scientists.

In evaluating the handwriting analysis argument, it should also be recognized that "expert" witnesses are not the only witnesses that can testify about the genuineness of handwriting. Persons who are familiar with a person's handwriting can also testify about whether or not the handwriting is authentic. Their opinions are considered by the court alongside the opinions of the experts as bearing on whether a document is genuine. Thus nonexpert testimony by those familiar with a person's handwriting has to be taken into account; it cannot be simply ignored by the court.

 For example, in Skidmore v. Gilcrease, slip op. (Ark Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1984), an Arkansas court was confronted with a handwritten will. Three nonexpert witnesses "had known the deceased for substantial periods of time, they were familiar with his handwriting, and they all unequivocally identified the writing as being in his handwriting." On the other side, a handwriting expert testified that the will was a forgery. The court chose to believe the three nonexperts over the expert. The appellate court agreed; since the expert was less believable than the three lay witnesses familiar with the deceased's handwriting, the court was justified in accepting their testimony and discounting the expert's claim that forensic science proved the writing was a forgery.

Assuming that many persons familiar with the prior Karmapa's handwriting were to testify to its authenticity in court, such testimony based on personal knowledge would be considered conclusive "forensic evidence" of authenticity for a court in the US system. If other witnesses dispute the authenticity based on their own personal knowledge, the court would be required to assess relative credibility of the parties in rendering its decision.

Even when the samples are in English and the documents are familiar, handwriting experts often disagree on the genuineness of a written document

My research indicates that handwriting experts cannot be expected to resolve this debate, because such experts often disagree on their analysis of the genuineness of a written document when each side of the controversy hires their own expert. There are countless examples of such disagreement among experts. A wide selection of cases from different areas in the United States is discussed below. In a criminal case, a federal court of appeals considered testimony as to who had sent an anonymous threatening letter through the mail. Bass v. United States, 239 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1957). Two distinguished forensic scientists testified.

 The government expert was a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who had completed a two-year course in document identification, and had thereafter worked as a document examiner in the laboratory of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for eight years. The [defendant's] examiner had been, for sixteen years, an examiner of questioned documents in the Post Office Department, and had instructed and trained document examiners for that department of the federal government for eleven years. Appellant's expert witness and the government's expert witness completely disagreed in their expert opinions as to whether the handwriting in the specimen given by appellant was the same as in the anonymous letter.

Id. at 713. The jury believed the witness from the FBI, but the court of appeals nullified the jury's decision because the government's expert had an unfair advantage in his "analysis."

In Danvir Corp. v. Wahl, (slip op. Sept. 8. 1987) in Delaware Chancery court, the signature on a stock certificate was at issue. Plaintiffs claimed to be the only stockholders in the company while defendant claimed that stock ownership was evidenced by the stock certificate. The court noted that "Plaintiffs' handwriting expert testified at trial that certificate No. 1X is a forgery" and "defendants' handwriting expert reached the opposite conclusion." Accordingly, the court concluded that the "testimony of the handwriting experts does not weigh on either side because they reached opposite conclusions as to the genuineness of the signature on that certificate and I find no basis on which to prefer one expert opinion over the other."

In a criminal case, Missouri v. Bailey, 659 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), the state of Missouri wanted to prove that the defendant was guilty of passing a bad check. The issue in the case was thus whether a check had been forged. The state's handwriting expert, who testified that the check was forged by defendant, "was contradicted by the defendant's handwriting expert" who testified that defendant had not written the check. The appellate court held that it was for the jury to choose which expert was more credible: the defendant's or the state's.

 A federal Court of Appeals considered a case in which an insurance company wanted to avoid paying out on an insurance policy. Continental Casualty Co. v. Brightman, 437 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1972). To avoid payment, the insurance company claimed that insurance policy application was forged and thus it did not have to pay the insured's claim. The insurance company hired its own forensic scientist who testified that the application was a fake, but the court decided not to believe the insurance company's handwriting expert. Instead, the court credited the opinion of the handwriting expert for the insured's representative, who testified that the application was genuine. The court accordingly required the insurance company to pay on the policy.

  A federal district court in Utah was faced with whether a crucial affidavit submitted in the case was authentic. The court had to weigh the testimony of two conflicting handwriting experts about the authenticity of an affidavit. One forensic scientist said the affidavit was a forgery while the other handwriting expert argued that the affidavit was authentic. Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, 489 F. Supp. 333 (Utah 1977). The court chose to credit the defendant expert's view that it was a forgery in part because of other testimony by nonexperts.

A husband and ex-wife were at odds in Greco v. Jordan, 419 So.2d 42 (La. Ct. App. 1982). The husband claimed his wife had agreed to and signed a document dividing their community property. The wife claimed her signature on the document was forged. The Court of Appeals in Louisiana noted that the plaintiff's handwriting expert testified that a "signature was a forgery [of plaintiff's signature] while the defendant offered two experts who testified that the signature in question was the plaintiff's." The lower court had decided to disbelieve the two experts hired by defendants and agreed with the position of the plaintiff's expert.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut faced a similar issue where a former wife claimed that her ex-husband had forged her name on a deed conveying property of the wife to the ex-husband. As usual, "the defendant's handwriting expert testified that the signature on the deed was that of the plaintiff. . . [and] the plaintiff's handwriting expert testified that the plaintiff did not sign the deed and that the deed was a forgery." Smith v. Smith, 438 A.2d 842 (Conn. 1981). The trial court in this case disbelieved the defendant's expert and accepted the view of the plaintiff's expert.

  These cases demonstrate that handwriting analysis is not a body of knowledge that provides definitive proof. In commercial and criminal litigation in the United States, it is common for opposing parties to obtain experts to support both sides of a claim: the plaintiff has an "expert" who testifies the writing is forged; the defendant has another "expert" who testifies that the writing is authentic. The courts recognize this and hence do not treat the testimony of handwriting experts as fact , but merely as informed opinion which must be weighed against the remainder of the evidence.

If certainty is sought by process of subjecting the Prediction Letter to handwriting analysis, one will be disappointed. To expect such a result is to labor under the misapprehension that handwriting experts or forensic scientists can supply "scientific facts" to which all will readily assent. This is a fictitious picture of the world of experts. Those familiar with the use of experts in contested matters recognize that experts do not provide "facts." As the courts understand completely, handwriting experts merely give their opinions. "Expert opinions" differ from the opinions of lay persons; they are more complicated, and rely on different reasoning -- but not necessarily more reliable opinions than those provided by lay persons.

Conclusion

  Forensic science cannot determine the genuineness of the Prediction Letter. In the first place, one cannot obtain a reliable forensic analysis of the Prediction Letter. On its own terms, forensic science is unreliable when there are no handwriting experts familiar with the Tibetan cursive writing system and when there exists no samples of other documents written by His Holiness Karmapa under similar conditions. It is hard to imagine what are similar conditions to a letter composed when H.H. Karmapa was, according to the practice in which the letter is reportedly composed, prepareing a special testament.  In the second place, it is well settled that evaluations by individuals with knowledge of the individual's handwriting are usually preferable to experts without any prior familiarity with the handwriting sample. Such evaluations have been provided and should be considered conclusive in these circumstances. Third, even when forensic examiners face known languages and documents, they often disagree. Handwriting analysts in the current situation cannot be counted on for unbiased, objective decisions. There is a high probability that the side which hires the handwriting expert will be able to retain an "expert" analysis at a rate which guarantees that the "expert" opinion will accord with the position the side holds from the start.

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